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Foreword
This is the third paper in the Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper series, a product of
IFPRI's 2020 Vision initiative, which seeks to develop an international consensus on how to meet future
world food needs while reducing poverty and protecting the environment. In this paper, Christopher L.
Delgado, of IFPRI's senior research staff, takes a critical look at the changing paradigms of agricultural
development that have influenced agricultural policy in Africa since the colonial era.
The review shows how current approaches to meeting Africa's agricultural challenges to the year 2020
developed. It concludes that Africans have had relatively little input into the intellectual bases of strategies
affecting their rural areas, a situation that must be changed if future strategies are to be effective in dealing
with Africa's problems of development.
Despite a shifting search over many years for a magic wand to put the continent on the path to sustained
agricultural development, the challenges for the year 2020 remain greater than ever. There may be an
emerging consensus as to the true issues: how to raise rural productivity, how to lower astronomical transport
costs, how to promote increased rural employment, how to reintegrate remote and difficult areas into national
growth strategies, and how to ensure that future strategies and action are designed and implemented by
Africans. Yet there is little evidence of an agreed vision of the best way to deal with these challenges, and
some evidence that the lessons of earlier eras have not been fully incorporated into strategic thinking. The
paper illustrates that it is vital for African governments and their foreign partners to invest heavily in the
people and institutions of the region, which can ensure continuity in the formulation, implementation, and





This paper was presented at the 2020 Vision Initiative Workshop on Issues Facing African Countries, Saly
Portudal, Senegal, December 14–17, 1994. The many helpful reactions received from participants in the
workshop and from others since are gratefully acknowledged. In particular, the comments of Harris Mule,
Gerry Helleiner, George Abalu, Ousmane Badiane, Cherif Chaco, Alain de Janvry, Wilfrid Mwangi, Kimse
Savadogo, and Gordon Sithole have affected the shape of the present revision. Needless to say, it seems
likely that some of them do not agree with at least some of the interpretations in the paper, and thus the end
result is my sole responsibility.A
For convenience, the term “Africa” is used for the region in this paper. It excludes the six countries of North Africa and the
1
Republic of South Africa because these countries are felt to have had such a significantly different history of agricultural
development from the rest of the continent that including them would obscure more than it would clarify.
perennial academic debate inside and out- ment works and how it can best be promoted; they
side Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter referred are examples of how agricultural development is
to as “Africa” ) is whether the collective experience supposed to be done. The term correctly conveys the
1
of the region somehow sets it apart from the rest of notion of a stylized ideal, rather than a pragmatic
the Third World: Is Africa different? Another approach to achieving a set of objectives, more
perennial debate is whether it makes sense to refer suitably conveyed by “strategy.”
to “Africa” at all, since the region is clearly hetero-
geneous in so many ways. Yet it is clear that the
outside world, at least, tends to have fairly definite
views about Africa as an entity, where it has been,
and where it is going. African agriculture is no
exception to the rule.
Similarly, there has been no shortage of recipes increased emphasis on private initiative, human cap-
for promoting African development, including ital development, and the development of non-
agriculture. Given the underlying diversity of the governmental institutions (Eicher 1992). The social-
region, it is remarkable how similar the main lines ist planning models of the 1950s have also given
of agricultural development strategy were in the way to market liberalization strategies. Furthermore,
countries of the region from just before the First the equation between growth and development as
World War until the late 1950s. While differences objectives in the 1960s has shifted to a more general
and debates existed, with few exceptions they did policy concern about the fate of the poor. Finally,
not fundamentally concern the importance of agri- the period since 1980, in particular, has seen consid-
cultural development, its purpose, and the main erable interaction and convergence among what
means of promoting it. All of this was to come, Cornia and Helleiner (1994) have characterized as
starting in the 1960s and taking off in the 1970s. neoliberal monetarist, dependency, and structuralist
During the last 25 years, African policymakers
have been bombarded with advice on agricultural All of these approaches have been reflected in
development strategy, often conflicting, and often the evolution of agricultural development strategies
motivated by divergent theoretical views of how over the 1960-94 period, which is hardly surprising
agricultural development works and its impact on for a sector that still accounts on average for 70 per-
overall economic welfare. A broad overview of the cent of employment, 40 percent of exports, and
common experience of the region yields consider- 33 percent of gross domestic product (Jaffee 1992).
able insight into the origins and reasons behind Therefore, this paper will look at the changing role
today’s policy debates on agricultural development ascribed to agriculture in overall development
strategy. It also raises the question of whether these strategy from the standpoint of explaining changes
debates are converging in a way that is useful for in prevailing philosophies about how to promote
guiding agricultural development strategy in any agricultural development, and not from the stand-
given country in Africa. point of explaining changes in overall paradigms.
Agricultural development strategies correspond
to what countries have tried to do to promote devel-
opment objectives in agriculture. As used here,
“paradigms” symbolize the underlying body of Despite the diversity of Africa, it can be argued
beliefs on how the process of agricultural develop- that there are key similarities across the countries of
This paper is not about the evolution of broader
development ideology in Africa, which is a vast,
fluid, and different topic. Since most African coun-
tries achieved independence in 1960, emphasis has
shifted from faith in the State and foreign assistance
as leading factors of the development process to
positions on African economic development.
Specifically the paper will avoid exploring in detail
debates over the ends and means of economic
development more generally. 2
the region that permit a schematic overview of agri- —possibly an inordinate—role by Third World
cultural development strategies. Each one of these is standards in the intellectual elaboration of develop-
relevant to the experience of a large number of ment strategies of many countries in the region.
countries in the region at any one time over the past Ninth, a relatively small group of donor agencies
35 years. By taking a broad-brush look at these has had a huge influence over the allocation of
development strategies, a clearer perspective on public goods investment of different countries. Such
what has been tried and abandoned emerges, and the investment is the centerpiece of agricultural devel-
extent to which more recent strategies build on opment strategies.
earlier principles. Furthermore, insights can be
derived for major issues that have arisen in different
ways in all agricultural development strategies in
Africa, and those that should at least be addressed in
discussion of future paths to follow. 
In fact, major structural similarities among discussed in detail below. The approximate time
countries of Africa are probably unprecedented else- frame for the dominance of each paradigm and the
where and in other eras. What is unique is that intellectual links between them are sketched in
people in so many different countries were jointly Figure 1.
and thoroughly affected and within such a short
historical time frame. Given these similarities, it is
not surprising that agricultural development strate-
gies in the region should have something in com-
mon, at least some of the time, nor that they should
have changed over time.
Similarities and Dominant Paradigms
Nine main similarities among African countries
stand out for present purposes. First, virtually all of
the countries in the Sub-Saharan region were sub-
jected for at least 80 years to one form or another of
European colonial rule, a fact that still affects devel-
opment patterns today. Second, many of the coun-
tries of the region became independent at roughly
the same time, during a short period at the start of
the 1960s. Third, all but five countries of the region
were subjected to explicit or implicit military rule
during most of the first two decades of indep-
endence. 
Fourth, African nations emerged during a highly
polarized phase of human history—the Cold War.
Fifth, the common influence of major shifts in world
economic events—such as commodity booms, oil
shocks, and foreign assistance—on developing
countries as a group has been arguably greater in the
historical period of Africa’s emergence since the
1960s than was the case in earlier periods. Sixth, the
common influence of demographic factors prevalent
in many African countries tends to distinguish the
region from other areas of the world, especially the
very high rates of population growth.
Seventh, the African intelligentsia has until
recently been largely educated in a relatively small
number of non-African countries. Eighth, the same
groups of expatriate thinkers have played a major-
At least nine qualitatively different dominant
paradigms for fostering agricultural and rural devel-
opment have been widely observed at different
times in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1960s. They
are presented in the flow chart in Figure 1 and
These paradigms have at least five characteris-
tics in common. First, they developed in Africa in
roughly chronological order since the late colonial
period, yet considerable periods of chronological
overlap between them can be observed. Second, it is
probably incorrect to ascribe any of these paradigms
to a specific geopolitical or intellectual interest,
contrary to usual practice. Each of the paradigms
has proponents on the political right and left, in
universities and government ministries, and each has
both African and non-African champions. The
closest identification of a paradigm with an actor
might be the role of the World Bank vis-à-vis the
propagation of structural adjustment 1; however, it
will be argued further on that such an equation
obscures more than it clarifies about why this
became a widespread paradigm in the early 1980s.
Overall, development ideologies in Africa may
in some cases have had clear political affiliations,
and the heavy role of external decisionmaking in the
region over the review period suggests that these
affiliations were in considerable measure influenced
by global political differences. Yet, decisions to
push food versus export crops over the past 35 years
or to rely on large units of production versus small,
for example, have had both adherents and detractors
situated on the two sides of the main ideological
divide. For present purposes, it is not particularly
enlightening to attempt to relate changes in African
agricultural development paradigms during the
period to changing political situations in Africa.
A third characteristic of the paradigms is that
both their nature and their common application
across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were largely
the result of changes in world economic and politi-
cal events. The rate of growth of world trade—or
lack of it—says a great deal about the incentives for
regional economic integration during differentCommercialization via Cash Cropping,









1955   73
Basic Human Needs,
1970   79
Structural Adjustment 2,
Equity with Growth
1985   ? Sustainable Development,
1990   ?
Structural Adjustment 1
Demand Management,
1980   84
Supply-Shifters in
Agriculture,
1973   89
Regional Integration,
Food First,
1973   89
Figure 1   Dominant paradigms of agricultural development in Africa
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periods. The end of the Cold War has affected the
finances, if not the beliefs, of those charged with
elaborating strategies for agricultural development.
A fourth characteristic in common is that there
exists a tension within each paradigm between the
will to focus on a precise, well-defined, actionable
instrument and the desire to offer a broad vision of
how development occurs. This might be exemplified
by the debate in the 1960s over the relative merits
for cash crop promotion of commodity-specific
instruments, such as marketing boards, and single-
input instruments, such as fertilizer supply systems,
on the one hand, vis-à-vis comprehensive ap-
proaches, such as a package approach that includes
research, extension, input supply, and marketing, on
the other (Lele 1975; Eicher and Baker 1992).
Similar discussions within paradigms have been
observed throughout the modern history of agricul-
tural development in Africa. A current example
would be the debate between those who wish to
address overpopulation issues directly and immedi-
ately through birth control programs and those who
put much greater emphasis on measures to raise
rural demand for family planning measures.
A fifth characteristic in common is that the
basic design and mode of implementation of all
these paradigms come from outside Africa, even
though each paradigm undoubtedly has had genuine
African adherents. It is hard to think of other signifi-
cant regions of the world in modern times where
outside influences on basic development strategy
issues have been so pervasive. 
Chronology and Elements of the
Dominant Paradigms of Agricultural
Development
Commercialization via Cash Cropping
This strategy of agricultural and overall rural devel-
opment in Africa was started early in the colonial
era, and it has been extensively documented by
historians writing in both English and French
(Crowder 1968; Suret-Canale 1977). Starting around
1910 in most areas, export cropping took off in
earnest after the end of the Second World War, with
the rapid expansion of cropped area per agricultural4
worker following the expansion of cash cropping for give to large versus smallholder farms, diversifica-
export (Anthony et al. 1979). At the time, agricul- tion versus specialization, and farming systems
tural production was constrained primarily by lack research versus single-input or single-component
of access to markets and services and seasonal labor research, such as crop breeding (Lele 1975; Eicher
bottlenecks in indigenous farming systems. 1992; Eicher and Baker 1992). A common central
The commercialization-via-cash-cropping model
was extremely effective in that comprehensive
schemes narrowly focused on boosting the output of
specific items were combined with “new” (in terms
of the areas receiving them) seeds for plants with
significantly different seasonal labor profiles than
the traditional food crops. This permitted an expan-
sion of production with existing resources, despite
the existing seasonal labor bottlenecks. In this sense,
the expansion of cash crops such as peanuts, cotton,
and cocoa was as much a manifestation of technical
change as one of commercialization (Delgado and
Ranade 1987). The heyday of cash crop expansion
continued throughout the 1960s. This period saw
secular improvement in world commodity prices,
fueled by the postwar expansion in world trade, Perhaps unlike much of foreign assistance in a
until the first oil shock of 1973 (Lewis 1980). It was later era, it is arguable that technology transfer
also a time when many African smallholders first during the cash-cropping era gave African small-
obtained access to cropping opportunities previously holders something they could use (Lele 1991). This
reserved for colonial farmers (Heyer, Maitha, and naturally raised the question of what to do once the
Senga 1975). initial spurt from adaptations of imported varieties
The commercialization-via-cash-cropping
paradigm was primarily a growth strategy, consis-
tent with the then prevailing view that growth and
development were synonymous and that the binding
constraint on growth was foreign exchange. It was
also consistent with the prevailing view at the time
that the role of agriculture in economic development
was as a source of resources for industrialization. 
It probably is fair to say that it was ultimately
the strong comparative advantage of cash crops vis-
à-vis world markets, permitted by new access to
those markets, that allowed barriers to their adoption
to be overcome. For example, cash crops continued
to be produced (at marginal economic return, per-
haps) in West Africa at the end of the 1980s, when
the terms of trade had fallen 60 percent against them
relative to the beginning of the decade (Duncan
1993). This suggests that comparative advantage in
earlier times must have been extremely strong. It
may also explain why the role of the State in mar-
keting and processing was not a big issue in the
1960s, since the surplus generated by the new export
activities was so strong per unit of output relative to
alternatives that a good dollop was left over for
producers, even after marketing parastatals, rural
notables, fiscal authorities, and domestic and foreign
processors had taken large margins (Anthony et al.
1979; Delgado and Jammeh 1991). 
Debates among analysts within the cash-crop-
ping paradigm concerned how much emphasis to
tenet of the paradigm was the prime emphasis on the
adaptation and extension from afar of (somewhat)
known agricultural technologies in the form of cash
crops. Cultivation of many of these crops was a new
activity in many areas of Africa, involving a differ-
ent seasonal pattern of labor use than the food crops
that had dominated production systems until then.
This permitted greater labor input per land area
(Delgado and Ranade 1987). The growth spurt
largely came from the way export cropping fit into
indigenous farming systems, boosting aggregate
production. This focus within the paradigm on
technology transfer, technical assistance, and capital
transfer from abroad was consistent with the broader
development orthodoxy of the 1960s (Eicher 1992).
and technologies gave out. The question was raised:
to what extent should further research be adaptive or
basic? Farming systems research by itself as a prime
mover of change was probably not a large compo-
nent of strategies at this time (de Wilde 1967; Lele
1975, 1989a, 1989b). However, long-term farming
systems research was clearly a key facilitator of
cash crop development when other circumstances
were favorable (Eicher and Baker 1992).
Naturally, there was considerable change in the
broader paradigms of colonialism over the 1910 to
1960 period, when most African countries became
independent. Yet the view of the desirable role of
agriculture in economic development appears to have
been remarkably stable over the colonial period after
1910, at least relative to the period since then. Yet a
noticeable evolution began in the 1950s, with the
move to independence and the example of Fabian
socialism in the Third World provided by Indian
economic strategies of the time (Holdcroft 1984).
Community Development
The first use of the term “community development”
to denote an official strategy for preparing the
British colonies in Africa for independence has been
established as occurring in 1948 (Holdcroft 1984).
Later schemes with similar elements were called
“participatory development” and eventually “inte-
grated rural development.” The present paper rather5
arbitrarily sets the start date for community develop- needs were taken to include adequate nutrition,
ment in Africa as halfway through the 1950s, when health, and access to education. The direct approach
both the French and the British were beginning to to meeting needs was in contrast to the “trickle-
arrive at a consensus on the need for decolonization. down” approach of the cash-cropping paradigm. The
Community development projects in the late
1950s and 1960s were attempts to provide non-
revolutionary sources of change in rural areas, and
were especially meant to keep rural people occupied The rise of BHN was part of the broader refo-
in the countryside until economic growth could cusing of concern in development economics that
speed up enough outside agriculture to absorb new has been called “the growth-with-equity era since
entrants to the labor force (Lele 1975; Staatz and 1970” (Eicher and Staatz 1984). The use of the term
Eicher 1984; Eicher and Baker 1992).  “basic human needs” to designate an approach to
While there were differences of emphasis
between various approaches to community develop-
ment, the key elements with respect to agriculture
were the same. They typically involved a package of
rural social services and cottage-industry promotion,
yet the financing of these services continued to
come from the profits taxed from export cropping.
As such, the agricultural development part of the
community development paradigm continued to
resemble the commercialization-via-cash-cropping
paradigm, including the earlier emphasis on small-
holders, and an emphasis on technical assistance,
extension, and capital transfer (Eicher 1992). As an
agricultural paradigm, community development had
the added dimension relative to earlier cash crop-
ping of emphasizing the quality of human labor
input (such as schooling, skills, and health) in
agricultural production strategies. 
Community development activities in Africa
were largely patterned after the programs developed
in India in the 1950s (Holdcroft 1984; Staatz and
Eicher 1984), and were run as projects. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, they evolved, along with
growth-oriented cash-cropping packages, into inte-
grated rural development schemes (de Wilde 1967;
Lele 1975; Staatz and Eicher 1984). African inte-
grated rural development projects of the period,
while emphasizing broad social development, con-
tinued to look to cash cropping as the engine of
growth, and tended to be concentrated in export-
crop-growing areas. Gradually, in the early 1970s,
the compatibility of the commercialization-via-cash-
cropping paradigm with the social agenda of com-
munity development came to be criticized, marking
the rise of a new paradigm with major consequences As an agricultural development paradigm, BHN
for agricultural strategies. gave smallholder agriculture priority, more for
Basic Human Needs
Beyond the general concern with rural poverty in
the community development paradigm in the 1950s
and 1960s, the basic human needs (BHN) paradigm
argued for a direct approach to meeting the basic
needs of the poor as quickly as possible. “Basic”
specifics of the philosophy of BHN are summed up
in ILO (1977), Ghai and Radwan (1981), and
Stewart (1985).
development strategy is usually attributed to five
International Labour Office (ILO) country missions
of the early 1970s, and most notably in the present
context, the 1972 mission to Kenya (Eicher and
Staatz 1984; ILO 1977). In Africa, the advent of the
BHN paradigm was importantly linked with (1) the
mushrooming of capital cities and an urban under-
class due to the urban bias widely represented in
policies of the 1970s; (2) declining terms of trade
for most 
ties, combined with a commodity boom for those
lucky enough to have access to coffee, tea, or cocoa
land, which heightened rural inequality; (3) major
drought in the early 1970s that focused the world’s
attention on the extent of poverty and famine in the
Sahel and Ethiopia; and (4) major expansion in
development assistance flows to Africa in the 1970s,
which financed most of the BHN interventions.
As policy, BHN was a statement of priorities for
allocation of programmatic and public investment
resources. It undoubtedly guided donor priorities in
the 1970s, and it was reflected in African national
priorities in particular through major national
emphasis on food production for increased self-
sufficiency (Eicher and Baker 1992). As a develop-
ment paradigm, it argued that improving the welfare,
education, technical knowledge, and active partici-
pation of all people—especially those at risk—will
do more to increase both productive capacity and
actual production than growth strategies that rely on
economic linkages (trickle-down) for transmission
of benefits. The literature of BHN tends to be
eloquent on the need to have a proactive distributive
policy under growth. 
distributive reasons than for growth. Because
trickle-down was rejected, effectively increasing the
incomes of the poor meant targeting the poor, and in
the 1970s these were primarily smallholder farmers.
A secondary, growth-oriented rationale is also
developed for targeting smallholders in the BHN
literature in studies that show that smallholders are
more efficient agricultural producers than large6
estates (Stewart 1985). Food production is urged
over export crop production, again because poverty
alleviation is the allocation criterion and local food
production is felt to target the poor more effectively
than local cash crop incomes.
The BHN literature for Africa tends to be a bit
vague as to where short- and medium-run sources of
growth are likely to be found. There is a definite
hint that it will come from outside smallholder
agriculture, probably in small-scale manufacturing
(Stewart 1985; Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe 1992;
Stewart 1994). Furthermore, the links between
proposed transfers to the poor and the means to
finance them in the short and medium run tend to
focus on redistributive policies, such as land reform,
as opposed to economic linkages from public goods
investment or other factors shifting the aggregate
supply curve (Ghai and Radwan 1983; Stewart, Lall,
and Wangwe 1992; Cornia, van der Hoeven, and
Mkandawire 1992). Regarding production policies
in rural areas, the BHN literature tends to focus on
improving productivity of landless labor,
particularly in the nonfarm informal sector. The
problem of productivity increases for landowners is
given less attention.
The debate between a broad and narrow focus
within this paradigm primarily concerns what
constitutes a “basic need.” This was somewhat a
question of the extent of distribution policies, such
as whether shelter and clothing should be in the
package with clean water, food, and health services.
More fundamentally, the issue was raised as to
whether the right to employment should be guaran-
teed by policy. Recently, it has also included a right
to free political expression and participation
(Stewart 1985).
The political issue raised the complex question
of how best to ensure that smallholders benefit from
a policy environment that favors their production
interests. Lack of legitimate local government in
rural areas that can be held accountable by farm
people was felt to be a widespread attribute of
military-style governments in Africa in the 1970s.
Reestablishment of local government was also felt
to be critical to securing proagriculture policies and
mobilizing resources in rural areas (Mellor,
Delgado, and Blackie 1987). It is hard to judge the
growth results of BHN policies as a rural
development paradigm seen two decades later,
since, as will be argued below, events outside
agriculture were shaping agricultural outcomes in
the 1970s. Yet the intellectual influence of BHN on
development thinking toward Africa in the 1990s is
undisputable.
Regional Integration in Industry, National 
Self-Sufficiency in Food
Concurrent with the BHN paradigm in the 1970s,
overall economic strategy in Africa—as else-
where— tended to emphasize industrialization
(Aboyade 1976). Given the size of the market in
most African countries, this started first as import
substitution for a very limited range of consumer
items such as beer, matches, and textiles. Even this
substitution was dependent on regional market-
sharing arrangements (Robson 1983; Guillaumont
and Guillaumont 1988).
The orientation toward import-substituting
industrialization became most significant for agri-
cultural paradigms in the 1970s, when the easy
stages of industrial import substitution were largely
used up. This period coincided with a deceleration
in the annual rate of growth in world trade from a
post– World War II norm of 8 percent per year to
2 percent per year following the 1973 oil shock;
under these conditions, proposals for regional
economic integration through common external
tariff protection have historically tended to enter
into strategy debates (Lewis 1980). Africa was no
exception. Furthermore, those African countries that
had done best in cash cropping in the 1960s ob-
tained relatively easy financing for urban invest-
ments due to prior cash crop success and heightened
petrodollar lending in the international banking
system. Incentives in those countries gradually
shifted after 1973 from favoring agriculture to
favoring urban manufactures (World Bank 1981;
Gbetibouo and Delgado 1984; Oyejide 1986;
Degefe 1994). 
Although regional economic integration in the
1970s was not an agricultural development para-
digm per se, it had two major effects on agriculture
in Africa. These effects were so important that they
should not be neglected in a survey of agricultural
development paradigms, yet during the 1970s they
were disguised by the commodity booms of the late
1970s, which helped maintain the relative profitabil-
ity of export crops, at least temporarily, and facili-
tated food imports (Gbetibouo and Delgado 1984;
Bigsten and Ndung’u 1992).
The first effect was a steady appreciation of the
real exchange rate, due to the policy measures
designed to support industrialization. This had the
effect of discouraging export crop production
(Oyejide 1986; Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés 1988).
Second, regional economic integration affected the
demand for food imports, both directly and indi-
rectly.  Overvalued  exchange  rates  and  swelling7
cities directly encouraged rapidly rising food im- vinced) reentered the limelight of the strategy debate
ports for urban areas. Indirectly, prices of non- with the inauguration of Structural Adjustment
tradable traditional foods (roots and tubers, millet, Program (SAP) lending by the World Bank in 1979
and so forth) increased relative to imported rice and (World Bank 1981). The early years of SAP—to
wheat, as predicted by economic theory in cases of roughly 1984—were qualitatively very different
exchange overvaluation (Delgado and Miller 1985; from SAP since then (Husain 1994), especially with
Delgado 1992). respect to agricultural development paradigms; thus
At the same time, the world environment was
also conducive to a greater focus on food produc-
tion. Policy thinking was influenced by two events
in particular: the 1974 drought and famine in the The early phase of structural adjustment (SA 1)
Sahel and Ethiopia and the 1975 world price spike has been characterized as reflecting broader intellec-
for rice following the 1973 oil shock. These events, tual trends of the period, amounting to no less than
combined with rising relative prices for traditional “a break-up of the neo-Keynesian consensus, and a
food staples, caused increased concern about Afri- revival of the neoclassical approach to policymak-
can domestic food production in the 1970s. ing” (Demery 1994, 29). In any event, SA 1 had a
The policy response focused on boosting Afri-
can food production and creating parastatal market-
ing organizations to feed the city populations
(Eicher and Baker 1992). During the 1970s, policy
literature often denounced the research “neglect” of
food crops during the cash cropping era and empha-
sized agricultural research and extension for both
traditional nontraded foods and for rice. In West   SA 1 was a reaction to the events of the 1970s,
Africa, major investments were made during this most particularly to unsustainable budget deficits
period in dams for irrigated rice production. Farm- and foreign exchange shortages. The strategy under-
ing systems research, with a particular emphasis on lying SA 1 was based on the premise that the emerg-
traditional food crops, became more important. ing agricultural and overall development problems
Increasingly, references to “agricultural” strategy were the result of artificially distorted price incen-
referred in fact to “food production” strategy. tives. SA 1 therefore focused on measures to pro-
“Food” was considered strategic both because it was mote macroeconomic balance through aggregate
the most “basic” of needs and because food prices demand management (Husain 1994). Economic
were politically sensitive in the cities; it was becom- adjustment required shifting incentives from net
ing harder and harder to keep the lid on prices. consumers of tradables (civil servants, workers in
During this period, support for the principle of protected manufacturing industries, service provid-
giving priority to smallholder food production ers, and so forth) to net producers of tradables. The
systems in Africa spanned the ideological spectrum latter overwhelmingly were smallholder farmers
from neoclassical liberals to neo-Marxist depend- producing agricultural exportables. Unfortunately,
ency theorists. corrections needed to occur just when the external
A major debate of the period that crossed
ideological lines, and that is reappearing today,
concerns how much emphasis to give in food pro- The SA 1 paradigm was essentially based on
duction strategy to replication of the Asian seed- four actions: (1) freeing up the nominal exchange
fertilizer revolution for smallholders in the irrigable rate, to permit it to move in reaction to supply and
zones versus improving production in the better demand pressures on foreign exchange reserves,
rainfed areas and in the low potential areas (Eicher which meant substantial devaluation in most cases;
1982; Mellor, Delgado, and Blackie 1987; Otsuka (2) moving toward unification of tariffs, with the
and Delgado 1994). In any event, in the period from objective of unifying effective exchange rates faced
1975 to 1985, irrigated agriculture got the lion’s by different sectors; (3) undertaking fiscal austerity,
share of public investment for agricultural produc- thus preventing rapidly rising wages from reclaim-
tion in several regions of Africa (World Bank 1989). ing any reduction in net consumption of tradables to
Structural Adjustment 1—Demand Management
Export agriculture and emphasis on indirect eco-
nomic mechanisms (“trickle-down” to the uncon-
the two periods are dealt with separately here. The
earlier period can be termed the “demand manage-
ment” or “stabilization” era, or SA 1 for short.
radical effect on African development strategizing
in general and on agricultural policy in particular;
all major paradigms since SA 1 are in truth
post–SA 1. Therefore, this paper will deal with the
period since 1984, or SA 2, in a later section, after
exploring other paradigms spawned as alternatives
to SA 1.
terms of trade for Africa’s agricultural exports were
falling rapidly.
be had from devaluation; and (4) liberalizing mar-
kets, to ensure that increased foreign exchange
earnings from export crops would make their way
back to farmers and not go to reimburse the debts of
parastatals (World Bank 1981). Like all statements8
of strategy in large organizations, SA 1 was hotly tive proposals to deal with agricultural problems
debated within as well as outside the World Bank at facing governments at the time (Mureithi 1985).
the time. Nevertheless, SA 1 was further elaborated
without a major change of focus—albeit more
diplomatically and with increased recognition of the
donors’ role in producing the distortions in the first
place—in two subsequent World Bank publications
(1984, 1986).
Unlike the paradigms of the 1970s, the early action plan for implementation, as a condition for
SAP presented a clear, internally consistent, theoret- loans. Thus governments were expected to come up
ically based, and—in theory, at least—simple with consistent and specific national and sectoral
strategy for promoting agriculture, which could be strategies to implement the broad principles.
implemented by policy reforms (as opposed to
expensive investments). But as an agricultural
paradigm, it was essentially passive: it said what not
to do. The proactive policy content primarily con-
cerned events outside the agricultural sector per se,
and it only peripherally addressed nonprice policy
issues within agriculture.
The SA 1 paradigm was not simply a creation of quacies in the resources and institutions of govern-
the World Bank or of Elliot Berg, the principal au- ment and governance to elaborate such strategies. 
thor of the landmark 1981 report (World Bank
1981). In fact, it was motivated in large part by the
concerns of African ministers of finance, who had to
produce the foreign exchange to meet the burgeon-
ing demands of other ministries. One of the earliest
structural adjustment loans was in Senegal, where in
1979 the government approached the World Bank on
this matter, and not the other way around, following
a disastrous peanut crop in 1978 that added to imbal-
ances already in place (Delgado and Jammeh 1991).
Yet this simple, clear, painful strategy of tre- to change it from a passive to a proactive strategy,
mendous scope with limited principles of action had particularly for the agricultural sector. The para-
many critics inside and outside of Africa. Consider- digms will be examined in turn.
ation here is limited to the debate over agricultural
strategy. The Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB)
joined forces to denounce the 1981 report and to
emphasize an alternative plan called the Lagos Plan
of Action (Browne and Cummings 1984; Adedeji
and Shaw 1985; Shaw 1985; Ravenhill 1986). With
regard to agricultural strategy, both the Lagos Plan
and the ECA\AfDB critique of the 1981 Bank report
were essentially pessimistic about whether aggre-
gate supply response in African agriculture would
be adequate to improve agriculture’s terms of trade.
They distrusted the idea that the private sector and
farmers would respond to prices and the freedom of
maneuver. They also disliked the emphasis on
export agriculture, which smacked of the colonial
period to the detriment of the food self-sufficiency
objectives of the 1970s. They saw the real exchange
rate analysis argument as a way to reduce Africa’s
role in its own affairs, by reducing African indus-
trial output. Counterarguments to the 1981 report
were hampered by the lack of any concrete alterna-
But the early proponents of SA 1 were also
hampered by the same problem—lack of concrete
proposals. In its original formulation as a passive
demand management strategy, SA 1 insisted on
acceptance of broad principles for economic reform
and elaboration by host governments of a realistic
By the mid-1980s, it was increasingly apparent
in Africa that such strategies were not being devel-
oped. In part, this was probably due to a political
impasse in many countries, since the agricultural
policies of the 1970s were driven by vested interests
(Bates 1981), and these same interests still predomi-
nated in policymaking. In part, it was due to inade-
Faced with a lack of clear, realistic, politically
legitimate expressions of agricultural strategy in
most African countries, technical people in donor
agencies and government ministries set out in the
mid-1980s to design technical strategies for promot-
ing agricultural growth (Delgado and Jammeh
1991). The result was three different paradigms that
were all developed in the mid-to-late 1980s. The
first paradigm sought to provide an alternative to
structural adjustment, whereas the other two sought
Supply-Shifters in Agriculture
A paradigm to reemerge in the 1980s in reaction to
the early SA 1 paradigm for agriculture can be
loosely termed “supply-shifters,” in reference to an
earlier terminology concerning those nonprice
factors that shift agricultural production functions
upward, leading to more output for the same inputs.
The roots of the supply-shifters paradigm in
Africa were well established in the 1960s and 1970s
in some parts of the region. Seed-fertilizer innova-
tions for radically boosting maize production were
in fact applied in the 1950s in parts of eastern and
southern Africa (Rukuni and Eicher 1994). Yet it
came into its own as an agricultural development
paradigm in Africa at the beginning of the 1980s.
This is because of the obvious success by then—and
attempts to extend it to Africa—of the Asian Green
Revolution approach to boosting smallholder pro-
duction of rice and wheat in the 1960s and 1970s. It
is also because its emphasis on boosting food9
production fit in well with the dominant paradigms should subsidize food production in the early stages,
in the 1970s, particularly integrated rural develop- as the Asian Green Revolution countries did, or
ment and BHN. laissez-faire should prevail. The question was posed
By 1980, however, the emphasis of supply-
shifters on using public goods investment in roads,
research and extension systems, fertilizer supply
systems, and water control as entry points to agricul-
tural development put it in conflict with SA 1,
which emphasized price incentives and withdrawal
of input subsidies. Supply-shifters became an alter-
native agricultural development paradigm, one that
emphasized that price reforms were necessary but
not sufficient for sustained and rapid productivity
growth in African agriculture (Delgado and Mellor The supply-shifters paradigm continues to
1984). Although it was similar to the much older receive support from agricultural production scien-
commercialization-via-cash-cropping paradigm tists and is still the dominant development paradigm
without the export crops, the supply-shifters para- for agriculture in much of the world outside Africa.
digm also incorporated the insistence of SA 1 on the Yet it is probably correct to say that external donor
necessity of macroeconomic and trade regime agencies, which finance so much of investment in
reforms and the liberalization of agricultural input agricultural public goods in Africa, have moved
and output markets. Unlike the cash cropping away from this paradigm because of concerns about
paradigm of the 1960s and like the paradigms of the poverty and—more recently—sustainability issues.
1970s, it focused on increasing food production. A key distinction, to be explored later, lies in the
Thus, the paradigm differs from the early SA 1
primarily in the emphasis it gives to the food side of
the agricultural sector, and within that to public
investment in research, extension, and infrastructure
to support production. Inflows of private productive
resources to agriculture were thought to depend as
much on the right types of public investment in the The hardships of the 1980s in rural areas,
sector as on relative prices, under conditions found brought about by the unhappy combination of a need
in most African countries (Eicher 1982; Delgado for policy reforms based on austerity, low world
and Mellor 1984; FAO 1986; Mellor, Delgado, and commodity prices, and rapid population growth,
Blackie 1987; Lele 1989a, 1989b, 1991; Rukuni and have already moved the focus of attention to a third
Eicher 1994). paradigm to arise out of the early SA 1. This is the
Although the early manifestations of the supply-
shifter paradigm in Africa focused heavily on
technical assistance, resource transfers, and technol-
ogy transfer (the latter from Asia), much like the
dominant overall development paradigm of the
1960s, it evolved over the 1980s to place much
greater emphasis on institutional and human capital
capacity building (Eicher 1994).
As in the earlier cash-cropping paradigm, a
debate exists within the supply-shifter paradigm
over whether to focus on a small number of priori-
ties before moving forward or to pursue a more
comprehensive approach to public investment in
agriculture. Should policy focus only on getting the
rate of growth of fertilizer up before turning to the
next problem, or is a more comprehensive strategy
necessary and feasible? Similarly, should the prior-
ity be irrigation systems or skilled people?
Another key debate under the supply-shifter
paradigm, which shows its contemporaneous exis-
tence with REI 2, concerned whether public policy
whether Africa can feasibly return to the model of
the 1970s, where more than four-fifths of the invest-
able public resources for agriculture were devoted to
the less than 5 percent of land that is irrigable.
Finally and relatedly, while there was broad agree-
ment on how to increase production in the higher
potential areas such as the better maize lands of
Zimbabwe or the cotton lands of Mali, there was
disagreement over what to do in the drier and more
marginal areas.
difference between those who take a laissez-faire
approach to promoting cuts in unit costs of agricul-
tural production while proactively pursuing poverty
and environmental objectives and those who retain
the need for a proactive approach to boosting agri-
cultural productivity, while pursuing other goals.
real concern that the human cost of ignoring the
impact of adjustment strategy on the rural poor may
be too high. This third paradigm incorporates many
of the actors and ideas of the BHN paradigm.
Regional Integration 2, with Food First
World agricultural prices declined precipitously in
the mid-1980s, largely due to the spin-off effects of
increased agricultural subsidies in the United States
and the European Community. Food imports to
Africa were still rising, due to the continuance of
overvalued exchange rates in some countries,
growing urbanization, growing population, and the
effects of the 1984 drought. In this general context,
ideas that had been important parts of the previous
regional integration for industry and national food
self-sufficiency (REI 1) paradigm were brought
together into a new paradigm for agriculture offered
as an alternative to the agricultural parts of SAP. 
Broadly, this paradigm could be called regional
integration with food first (REI 2); it was an attempt10
to extend to food the sorts of arguments used to
protect industry in the REI 1 paradigm. A French
proposal for a common tariff barrier against rice in
Francophone West Africa was exhaustively dis-
cussed in West African and donor policy circles
between 1986 and 1989 (Club du Sahel and CILSS
1986; Requier-Desjardins 1989; France 1990;
Hugon, Coussy, and Sudrie 1991).
Although food self-sufficiency for food security
is a weathered topic in African debates, the explicit
linking of it to regional protection arrangements as
a paradigm for growth was novel. The issue of
regional stocks for food security had been proposed
in the Sahel in the 1970s and in the Southern Afri-
can Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC) in the early 1980s; both were shown to be
very costly (McIntire 1981; Koester 1986). The key
policy prescription of this paradigm involved differ-
ential protection for food to raise domestic food
prices relative to other prices in the protected areas.
Like all regional integration, the costs and benefits
would be borne unequally. The paradigm also
tended, like earlier regional integration paradigms,
to equate “agriculture” with “food,” which was
taken to mean “cereals,” which were taken to be
good substitutes for “imported cereals.”
The REI 2 strategy was founded in a vague way
on the belief that a West African Common Agricul-
tural Policy to protect cereals patterned after cereals
policies in the European Community would provide
the basis for a renaissance of peasant agriculture in
West Africa. No account was taken of the enormous
difference in feasibility between 95 percent of a
wealthy population supporting 5 percent through
price transfers and 25 percent of a poor population
supporting 75 percent. There was no real consider-
ation in the proposal for a protected space for rice in
West Africa of the impact on fiscal balances of
implementing such a scheme. There was also no
analysis of the impact of such a proposal on labor
costs, the incentives for tradables production, or the
effects on welfare of relative price rises for food
(Delgado 1991). In any event, West African govern-
ments declined to implement the strategy, despite
considerable prodding from some donors. 
 It is interesting to note in this context that
Nigeria adopted a strong protectionist policy for
food, using nontariff barriers, when adopting SA 1
for other sectors in 1986. Anecdotal evidence from
Nigeria since then suggests that this may have been
a strong contributing factor to the inability of the
government to implement SA 1’s prescription for a
fall in the real exchange rate (Delgado 1992). If so,
it illustrates the incompatibility of SA 1 reforms
with food protectionist strategies in countries where
a high share of the population is engaged in farming.
Structural Adjustment 2—Equity with Growth
Declining real world prices for Africa’s agricultural
exports, drought, and declining per capita real
incomes in African rural areas led to severe concern
about what was happening to the poor in a time of
macroeconomic retrenchment. A landmark report
sponsored by UNICEF assessed the serious food
security and social effects of demand contraction in
adjusting countries; its argument against the pure
version of SA 1 as a paradigm for development is
summed up in its title: Adjustment with a Human
Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting
Growth (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987). The basic
tenet, reinforced in subsequent literature, is that the
poor are the end and not the means of growth;
redistribution can be justified, even if it lowers
aggregate production in the short run (Cornia, van
der Hoeven, and Mkandawire 1992; Stewart, Lall,
and Wangwe 1992).
The broader paradigm that arose as part of these
concerns is labeled here as “Structural Adjustment
2—Equity with Growth.” It starts from the premise
that basic macroeconomic adjustment of the early
SA 1 type is necessary. It questions whether adjust-
ment can take place at all without a proactive effort
to involve the poor in growth. As Helleiner (1994a)
points out, even though these concerns started out as
an alternative paradigm under BHN their wide-
spread acceptance by many key actors, including the
World Bank, suggests an emerging new consensus.
The mainstream elements of this consensus are
labeled “SA 2” to emphasize its evolution from the
structural adjustment paradigm of the early 1980s.
Since the lead sector for SA 1 was export agricul-
ture and most poverty is found in rural areas, SA 2
can be seen as an agricultural development para-
digm as well as an overall paradigm.
The SA 2 paradigm focuses on three classes of
action. First, there is a need to know what are the
direct effects of adjustment on the poor, and what
can be done to alleviate these effects directly, for
example, by slowing down the adjustment process
or putting greater emphasis on supply increase
rather than demand contraction. Second, opportuni-
ties in the economy for rent extraction from the poor
should be removed, supporting the emphasis in
structural adjustment programs on market liberaliza-
tion. Third, proactive policies that help generate
income for the poor should be emphasized, even
where these have a small cost in overall efficiency
(Pinstrup-Andersen 1989; von Braun 1991; Duncan
and Howell 1991; Cornia and Helleiner 1994).
The primary debate within this paradigm is the
division between those who see poverty allevia-
tion and structural adjustment as complementary
strategies—or as being at least neutral to each other11
in the long run—and those who claim that there are 1994). The evolution of the paradigm into a focus
major contradictions between structural adjustment on the factor-market implications of agricultural
policies of the SA 1 type and long-run poverty development draws on an older literature in both
alleviation objectives. Many mainstream proponents Asia and Africa that emphasized the intersectoral
of SA 2 agree with the need for direct targeting of linkages between agricultural development and non-
the poor, while they do not challenge the current farm rural employment. It builds on the premise that
course of stabilization policy. Within the World labor is available in rural areas that can be more
Bank, a new emphasis has been placed on social fully employed at a somewhat constant price, even
safety nets, in the form of both inquiry into “the if the labor is largely found outside bottleneck
social dimensions of adjustment” and supplementary periods. 
project activity to mitigate the effects on the poorest
sectors (Kanbur 1990; Alderman 1991).
Yet even some otherwise mainstream authors rural poor can produce but that at present lack a
question whether the effects on the poor of adjust- local market, due to lack of local purchasing power
ments of the magnitude that Africa is making can be and high transport costs out of the local region. The
handled by add-on social programs, as opposed to a trick then is to find a sustainable way to broadly
modification of adjustment strategy itself (Pinstrup- increase incomes in rural areas in order to provide
Andersen 1989; von Braun 1991). More strongly, demand stimulus. Key debates that are ongoing with
some writers associated with the earlier BHN varying degrees of optimism concern (1) potential
paradigm have claimed that structural adjustment sources of sustained rural income growth to provide
polices in fact move economies away from long-run the initial purchasing power in rural areas;
paths of growth and poverty alleviation, while (2) whether the things that rural people buy when
admitting that some form of macro balance is their incomes increase are likely to be imported or
necessary. Stewart (1994), for example, sees con- made locally, and (3) the extent to which local
flicts between short-run adjustment policies and production is likely to respond to price incentives
long-run development objectives in four areas that (Haggblade, Hammer, and Hazell 1987; Bagachwa
are especially critical to agriculture as well as being and Stewart 1992; Delgado et al. 1994).
relevant to the rest of the economy: cuts in public
expenditure, a decline in investment, “indiscrimi-
nate” import liberalization, and encouragement of
primary exports. According to this view, a funda-
mental overhaul of adjustment policies is needed,
including placing priority on creating incentives for
increased manufactured exports.
Whereas the cash-cropping and SA 1 paradigms
tended to see agricultural exports as the primary
engine of growth in Africa, paradigms since the
mid-1980s have often been indifferent, sometimes
even hostile, to agricultural exports as a means of
development. More recently still, growth strategies
based on shifting supply curves for agricultural
tradables are making a comeback. In part, this is due
to recent improvements in agricultural commodity
prices; in part, it is because of growing awareness of
the potential for household spending from increased
smallholder-produced agricultural exports to stimu-
late demand-constrained rural sectors. 
A current agricultural extension of SA 2 as a
development paradigm incorporates much of the
supply-shifters emphasis on public investment in
research, extension, institutions, and infrastructure
to continually cut unit costs of agricultural produc-
tion. It also emphasizes the potential for labor-
intensive growth in rural areas, where most of the
poor are still concentrated (Mureithi 1985;
Haggblade, Hazell, and Brown 1987; Delgado et al.
The paradigm targets the need to specifically
increase demand in rural areas for the things that the
Even as the initial emphasis on demand manage-
ment in SA 1 led to three separate paradigms of
agricultural development in Africa, the elements of
a fourth, largely different paradigm began to be
forged out of interaction of two strategic concerns in
the post-structural adjustment era: participation and
natural resource conservation.
Sustainable Development
Like the previous paradigms in their heyday, the pres-
ent one—sustainable development—enjoys strong
donor support for an identifiable set of actions con-
sistent with the major tenets of the paradigm. Unlike
previous paradigms at comparable periods of donor
and host government acceptance, there is consider-
able disagreement as to the appropriate conceptual
framework for justifying those actions as a strategy
for agricultural development. As such, sustainable
development is not quite the same kind of paradigm
as the previous ones were. It is more akin to a map
pointing to where one wants to go, based primarily
on a view of where one does not want to go. Never-
theless, paradigm-like elements are beginning to
emerge that have gained widespread acceptance, at
least outside of Africa.
First, sustainable development is post-SA 1, in
the sense that the need to observe the main SA 1
tenets of policy reform is not contested. However, it
places great emphasis on the widespread degrada-12
tion of the agricultural resource base in Africa and opening to the outside world of the former socialist
the relationship of such degradation to externalities. countries has allowed everyone to see what can
The latter, such as the issues bound up with property happen when environmental considerations are
rights and degradation of common land, show con- ignored. 
flicts between a laissez-faire approach to market re-
form and sustainable development (Timberlake 1985).
The potential for conflicts between environmen- donor community through the publications of the
tal and equity concerns is also raised with SA 2, World Bank, still the most articulate and strategy-
since there may be short-run trade-offs between oriented of donor agencies. (See in particular World
natural resource degradation and human survival, Bank 1989; Cleaver 1993; Hoff, Braverman, and
especially in the poorer areas. Much of the current Stiglitz 1993; Cleaver and Schreiber 1994; and
work on developing the natural resource conserva- Crosson and Anderson forthcoming.) The first two
tion side of the paradigm is directed to finding paths references emphasize the value of agriculture to
that reconcile natural resource conservation for growth and equity, while the third contributes
future generations with immediate poverty allevia- importantly to the policy-oriented academic litera-
tion goals. In particular, it focuses on the very ture on the primacy of institutional and organiza-
different sets of issues posed in rainfed areas of low tional development in promoting rural areas in the
agricultural potential and those posed in higher- Third World, particularly agriculture. The fourth
potential areas that are more easily intensified. argues that agricultural growth is the essential ele-
The second pillar of sustainable development is
also a reaction to—or more correctly, a consequence
of—structural adjustment. That is, as the State with-
draws from organizing rural economic life, a vac-
uum is left that is not fully filled by the “private
sector,” as it is generally conceived. In reality, many
rural production activities, particularly new ones,
require some form of organization not found in
traditional societies, and individual merchants and
joint stock companies are only two of the
possibilities. There is, once again, tremendous
interest in local organizations, grassroot organiza- The main elements of the widespread interest in
tions, and other forms of participatory mobilization sustainable development that could properly be
of rural people.  considered an emerging paradigm are that rapid
This interest has led to a new conceptualization
of how the process of forming nongovernmental
organizations contributes to the agricultural (and
nonagricultural) development process, based on the
“new institutional economics” (de Janvry, Sadoulet,
and Thorbecke 1993; Nugent 1993). From the
standpoint of the paradigm, the key to decreasing
the huge transaction costs that characterize rural
(and other) trade in Africa lies in support of the
formation of these organizations.
This paradigm began to emerge at a time when
the end of the Cold War occasioned less emphasis in
donor circles on winning allegiances and more on
securing compliance with what is felt by donors to be
in the general interest of the development community.
The emergence of the paradigm also corresponds to
a period of relatively low world prices for agricultural
commodities. This is perhaps reflected in the low pri-
ority given to increasing agricultural production in
the donor countries at the present time, quite
independent of whether African countries are likely
to have the future import capacity to meet food needs
(Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). At the same time, the
 One can trace the evolution and variety of
strategic thinking about African agriculture in the
ment of a strategy to handle population growth and
preserve the environment. The fifth builds the case
for human capital formation in rural areas as the key
policy entry point to get agricultural growth moving
on a sustainable basis. Evidence that the sheer scope
of priorities held by donors at the present time is not
limited to the Bank is to be found in CIDA 1993,
which is a compendium of donor agency views on
African agriculture in the 1990s, and in UNDP
1993, which broadly emphasizes the participatory
mode of rural development. 
population growth, agricultural income stagnation,
and environmental degradation of rural areas are
part of a “nexus” (Cleaver and Schreiber 1994). The
three go together, and solutions to any one of them
will involve solutions to the other two as either a
consequence or a cause. The main policy instru-
ments offered are ensured access for rural women to
education, health, and agricultural production
services; improved property rights, including land
tenure and pricing of common pool resources; and
increased attention to urban development to provide
an outlet for rural labor. In all cases, support of
nongovernmental forms of organization in rural
areas is seen as vital to achieving lasting results in
these areas. Beyond participatory institutions, insti-
tutional development on the research and extension
side is emerging as the entry point to boosting total
factor productivity in agriculture, going beyond the
earlier concentration on seed-fertilizer issues.
Since income generation in rural households is
central to handling environmental and population
problems under this paradigm, the question arises as
to how to go about achieving this growth. Few13
proponents of the paradigm would take the more digms was to alleviate poverty. Paradoxically, the
neutral approach of the early SA 1 and wait for 1970s were a period when development strategies
policy reform, population density, and infrastructure were particularly discriminatory against agriculture.
development to induce growth. Most would also Third, agriculture’s tasks in development strategy
take a more proactive stand, as in the supply-shifters have increased in the last decade, raising questions
paradigm, with increased emphasis on institution as to the realism of what is being asked of the
building and rural human capital formation (Lele sector.
and Stone 1989; Cleaver 1993; Cleaver and Schrei-
ber 1994; Crosson and Anderson forthcoming).
Thus, as the paradigm evolves, greater emphasis
is being put once again on agricultural research,
human capital formation, and investment policies.
However, the objective also includes increased
agricultural output and resource conservation. The
former would come not only from adding inputs, but
particularly from higher-quality labor input. Such a
proactive or policy-led approach would target
opportunities for “sustainable intensification,” in-
cluding rainfed areas.
Controversies continue, however. The propriety
(for outsiders, at least) of various instruments to
promote democracy and participation is not broadly
agreed upon, even if many people think that the end
result may justify the means. On the technical side,
a debate is going on regarding the relative merits of
interventions to supply environmental and popula-
tion services directly (much like the basic human
needs approach of old) and, preferably, of ways to
increase the demand of rural people in Africa for
environmental and family planning services. Since
stimulating this demand largely involves finding
ways to provide sustained income increases to rural
households, this wing of the paradigm overlaps to
some degree with the strands of thought in the
equity-with-growth paradigm, at least on the poli-
cies recommended. 
Insights for Future Paradigms of
African Agricultural Development
The main lesson of history represented in Figure 1
is probably that every paradigm has its day, and then
the world moves on. There is no fundamental reason
to suppose that the current paradigms shown at the
bottom of the figure will be any different. Yet the
lines between boxes in Figure 1 also represent the
real intellectual heritage of the later paradigms vis-
à-vis the earlier ones; it is hoped that the lessons of
present experience will persevere in the future.
Table 1 illustrates three other broad trends in
strategizing for African agriculture. First, the view
of what agriculture’s main contribution to the over-
all development process should be has shifted quite
a bit since 1960. Second, growth has been a major
objective in every period except the 1970s, when
agriculture’s primary function in development para-
Evolution of the Paradigms toward an 
Emerging Consensus
The commercialization-via-cash-cropping paradigm
that reigned throughout the 1960s in Africa placed
the greatest emphasis on raising agricultural produc-
tivity in areas of comparative advantage. The ac-
tions undertaken arguably did more than most
strategies since then to build rural infrastructure,
lower rural transfer costs, and improve household
incomes and food security. One downside was that
it favored those zones with the most favorable
agricultural resources, and it had less to offer the
lower-potential zones. Another was that, as a strat-
egy, it was immune neither to domestic urban bias in
the 1970s nor to the meltdown of world commodity
prices in the  1980s. The question arises as to what
this strategy could again offer if both these problems
were remedied in the 1990s. The community devel-
opment paradigm did not fundamentally challenge
cash cropping as the main engine of growth, but
gave birth to institutions that could not be finan-
cially sustained when community services were
added to the cash cropping model in a top-down
fashion.
The basic human needs paradigm arose in
reaction to the perceived effect on equity of cash
cropping (or at least to the perceived lack of prog-
ress in eliminating poverty), and in frustration with
the results of community development. However,
unlike the community development era, the real
action on the growth strategy side during the BHN
era was in import-substituting industrialization,
which largely doomed the BHN objective of boost-
ing food production. Agriculture’s role in the
growth process was primarily as a passive supplier
of food and capital for activities outside of the
agricultural sector. As in the previous paradigm,
development strategy sought to make rural areas
more attractive to live in, while the main focus of
attention was preparing the cities to receive mi-
grants from the countryside.
Regardless of how well BHN policies might
have functioned in rural areas, they probably did not
stand a chance as a successful growth paradigm
under these conditions. There was little in the way
of mechanisms to stimulate sustained increases in
agricultural productivity, beyond one-shot redistri-14
Table 1—Primary objectives of agricultural development in Africa under the dominant paradigms
Paradigm Growth Equity Conservation Industrialization
Commercialization via
cash cropping, 1910–70    Yes         . . . . . . Yes
Community development, integrated 
rural development, participatory 
development, 1955–73     Yes         Yes . . . Yes
Basic human needs, 1970–79     . . .           Yes . . . . . .
Regional integration in industry (REI 1), 
national self-sufficiency in food, 1970–79     . . .         Yes . . . Yes
Structural adjustment 1—
demand management (SA 1), 1980–84     Yes          . . . . . . . . .
Supply-shifters in  agriculture, 1973–89     Yes          . . . . . . . . .
Regional integration, food first (REI 2),
1985–89     Yes          Yes . . . . . .
Structural adjustment 2—
equity with growth (SA 2), 1985–?     Yes          Yes . . . Yes
 
Sustainable development, 1990–?     Yes          Yes Yes . . .
butions of assets or broadening of access to services. ment adjustment itself, without much insight coming
In this sense, the BHN paradigm of the 1970s to the fore. 
applied to rural areas was perhaps more an equity-
oriented complement to a nonagricultural growth
strategy than an agricultural strategy itself. Never-
theless, BHN did put great emphasis on fundamental
development, through improvement of the human
condition in rural areas, and in this respect it laid a
foundation for future growth.
During the first half of the 1980s, the agricul- development, economists have become more con-
tural strategy agenda was preoccupied with finding scious since SA 1 of the importance of addressing
a way to cope with the overarching need for adjust- the extremely high transport costs in rural Africa as
ment, which arose in no small part from the discrim- a precondition for growth. Furthermore, there is a
ination against agriculture in the dominant overall wider view now, not evident in the original SA 1,
development paradigms of the 1970s, such as REI 1 that liberalization policies will not address these
and even BHN. These paradigms continued to view needs in full. 
agriculture’s role as a resource pool, like the cash-
croppers. However, unlike the cash-croppers, they
neglected to provide incentives to the agricultural
production activities that laid the golden egg. The
main point of the SA 1 paradigm—that events out-
side agriculture can have a determinant role on what
happens inside it—is now part of the received wis-
dom of current and future paradigms. Much of the
debate in the early 1980s was over how to imple-
During the second half of the 1980s, all the
actors—including the World Bank—in effect
became post–SA 1, in the sense that few seriously
debated the need for some major adjustments, but
most also saw the need to go beyond stabilization
policies. Along with renewed attention to nonprice
factors in countries at early stages of economic
Driven by the feeling that something important
for agriculture was being lost in the SA 1 debates,
and drawing on the 1970s preoccupation with
boosting food production, some analysts continued
work throughout the 1980s under what has been
characterized as the supply-shifters in agriculture
paradigm. This was a continuation of the cash-
cropping emphasis on raising agricultural productiv-
ity through public investment in research, extension,15
infrastructure, and input supply systems, but it was growth are very much part of the mainstream.
applied to food and inspired by the Green Revolu- Second, there is a widespread consensus on the need
tion in Asia and Latin America. Like its intellectual to build on agriculture for growth, and not just as a
precursors, it did not offer much assistance to the pool of resources. Third, “getting prices right” is
lower-potential areas, which are particularly numer- correctly perceived to be a more complex issue than
ous in Africa. While it had the advantage of strong simple prescriptions for market liberalization.
support from the agricultural science community Fourth, nonprice factors such as institutions and
and some visible success stories, like seed-fertilizer infrastructure are coming back onto the agenda—not
technologies elsewhere in the Third World, the as an alternative to market reforms, but as necessary
supply-shifters paradigm in Africa also had to deal complements to them. Increasing participation and
with equity and environmental-based challenges. a greater role for civil society are increasingly
The early concerns of both the cash-croppers and
the supply-shifters have persisted to become a major
issue for the future: that is, technological change in
agriculture that cuts unit costs of production must
once again become a rural development priority in
Africa. It is hard to see where Africa will get the food
necessary to feed its population in 25 years
otherwise. It is even harder to see where rural people
will get the income to buy food if their incomes do
not rise. This requires a dynamic agriculture to
stimulate both agricultural income and nonfarm
activities induced  by the purchasing power of agri-
cultural income. 
During the 1990s, those paradigms concerned
with equity-oriented strategies in agriculture have
made a comeback, with more stress this time on
regional and intrahousehold equity issues. Unlike
the BHN adherents of the 1970s, supporters of
today’s paradigms are also confronted with the need
to address environmental and population issues at
the same time. When these problems are added to
the underlying issue of how to increase agricultural
productivity—the comparatively simple problem
facing the cash-croppers of old in higher-potential
areas—quite a series of challenges lie ahead.
The focus of the determinants of total factor
productivity growth in agriculture, as opposed to
single-input productivity, has led to an emerging
consensus among those primarily concerned with
natural resource issues and those primarily con-
cerned with agricultural productivity. They have
reached agreement on the importance of improving
the quality of decisionmaking on the farm and the
necessity of institutional innovations to achieve that
objective (de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Thorbecke 1993;
UNDP 1993; Crosson and Anderson forthcoming).
More broadly, Helleiner (1994a) has eloquently
pointed out five areas of emerging professional
consensus with regard to development strategies in
Africa. These are of direct relevance to future
agricultural development paradigms when put in
terms of the analysis above. First, self-styled “alter-
native” approaches to both cash cropping and SA 1
no longer seem so unconventional. Some of the
main tenets of BHN as enshrined in equity-with-
recognized as necessary concomitants to the scaling
down of the State. Fifth, with the perception that
African rural economies produce large shares of
nontradables comes the recognition of the potential
importance of demand constraints. One might add
(with a smile) that reports that neo-Keynesianism is
dead are premature.
Lessons and Challenges for Future Paradigms
The present review suggests five specific challenges
that ought to be paramount for African food and
agricultural strategies with forward-looking
ambitions—challenges that find widespread support
in the literature surveyed, if not perfect agreement.
First, it will be imperative to find new sources of
sustainable productivity growth. There seems to be
no way around this for progress in countries where
so much of the population lives in rural areas and
the main sources of foreign exchange are crops and
livestock. It seems clear at this point that the issues
here go beyond price distortions, and that proactive
nonprice production policies of the types advocated
by the cash-croppers and supply-shifters will also be
necessary to meet the challenge.
Second, it seems clear that it will be hard to do
much for rural growth without finding a way to
address Africa’s very high transfer costs. Africa’s
relative costs in this regard far exceed those of any
other major region of the world, and they present a
difficult barrier to commercialization. A 50 percent
cut in the unit costs of distribution can be as valu-
able to competitiveness as a 50 percent cut in the
unit costs of production when the two are equal
components of c.i.f. prices. More broadly, as sug-
gested by de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Thorbecke
(1993), one of the major challenges of the post-SAP
era is to find ways through nongovernmental organi-
zations of various types to reduce transaction costs
generally in rural Africa.
Third, the needs of a growing population in
rural areas and the looming food security problem
suggest that agricultural development strategies in
the future cannot omit consideration of effects on
employment. The growth-with-equity literature of16
SA 2 suggests that there is in fact great scope for 1960s has been distressingly low, albeit growing
deliberately increasing the labor intensity of rural rapidly. This is undoubtedly an important explana-
growth paths. Strategic research needs to identify tion of why the dominant development paradigms
the costs and benefits of different options as a have shifted so much over so short a period of time
matter of great priority. One of the most fundamen- as 35 years. Other explanations include geopolitical
tal structural changes in Africa since 1960 has been change with the end of the Cold War, major shifts in
the rapid demographic change in rural areas, leading world commodity markets, other changes in the
to increasing rural differentiation based on access to donor countries, and, particularly, the weak legiti-
land. As Eicher (1994) points out, there are now macy of many African governments, which hinders
four farm types in Africa: resource poor, small- them from formulating and implementing rural
holder, progressive, and large-scale. This is a strategies capable of mobilizing the population.
fundamental change from the 1960s, when the mass Structural changes in world commodity markets and
of African farmers were not land constrained and the end of the Cold War are taken as givens, and
generally  were  far  more  homogeneous  in  access African societies are rapidly addressing the issues of
to resources (Lele and Agarwal 1989, cited in governance and political legitimacy. Donors can
Eicher 1994). avoid hindering the latter and they can do a great
Fourth, a paradigm needs to be developed that
integrates remote and lower-potential areas into
rural growth. While there is not a great deal of
technical disagreement on what is needed to boost The relative lack of genuine African input into
production in the highest-potential areas, there is the formulation of development paradigms separates
little consensus on the other 80 percent of cropped modern African experience from that elsewhere in
area. Current paradigms tend to ignore the special the world, and it accentuates the fact that the main
problems of lower potential areas, except as pools of challenge for development is to increase the capac-
labor or target zones for welfare transfers. ity of African entities to analyze past experiences
Experience suggests that attempts to make
lower-potential zones do the same things as higher-
potential ones are problematic. Outmigration alone
will not solve this problem. On the other hand, there
may be some scope for helping the lower-potential
areas to benefit symbiotically from growth in
higher-potential areas, through agricultural diversifi-
cation in the lower-potential areas into items con-
sumed in the adjacent higher-potential areas.
Finally, the degree of African intellectual input
in  constructing  the dominant paradigms  since the
deal to increase human capital and institutional
capacity for formulating appropriate agricultural
development strategies.
and to formulate new strategies for a better future.
The elaboration of viable paradigms of agricultural
development in different parts of Africa that can
address the complex issues raised here will require
local ownership, broad knowledge, and unwavering
commitment within the region. It is vital for African
governments and their partners to invest in the
institutions, procedures, and people capable of
mobilizing these three items. A broad push in this
regard is the only hope in the short historical time
frame of 25 years, to 2020.17
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